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Abstract
In a recent article, Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodème (2008) present
a novel model that motivates an extensive empirical analysis of inter-
national debt shifting. We point out that the model fails to account
for internal debt, and that once internal debt is properly accounted
for, the external debt mechanism they propose is not identified in the
empirical analysis. We also point out that aﬃliate specific debt costs
reduce aﬃliate dividends. When this is implemented in the model,
their regression equation can only be derived under the very restric-
tive assumption that eﬀective tax rates on dividends are the same in
all countries.
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1 Introduction
In a recent article Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodème (2008) (henceforth HLN)
present a novel model that motivates an extensive empirical analysis of in-
ternational debt shifting. They report their findings by stating: “..stronger
incentives for debt finance in one country encourage debt finance in that coun-
try but at the same time discourage debt finance in other countries to keep
the overall indebtedness of the multinational in check” (4th paragraph on p.
81).
This theoretical result is derived under two problematic assumptions.
The first is that internal debt is not part of the firm’s financing structure.
A main insight in the corporate finance literature is that internal debt and
equity are equivalent except for tax purposes, and that it is optimal for
a multinational firm (MNC) to use internal debt as part of a tax-eﬃcient
debt structure. The importance of this mechanisms is also documented in a
series of empirical papers.1 Their second assumption is that incentive related
debt costs that aﬃliates incur do not aﬀect aﬃliate dividends available for
repatriation. It is well known that in a static model as in HLN, net cash-flow
available for repatriation as a dividend in an aﬃliate consists of economic
profit plus the return to equity minus tax payments (see Sinn 1987, p. 66).
Thus, since economic profit is diminished by aﬃliate specific debt costs, such
costs do indeed reduce aﬃliate dividend payments. We show that (i) If the
first assumption is relaxed so that internal debt is allowed, the eﬀect of the
external debt mechanism in HLN is not identified. It is in fact likely that
the empirical results in the paper are driven by internal debt shifting. (ii) If
the second assumption is corrected, their regression equation (5) can only be
derived if eﬀective tax rates on dividends are the same in all countries. To
make these points more rigorous, we present a brief model.
1See Mintz and Smart (2004), Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004), Mintz and Weichenrieder
(2005), Büttner et al (2006) and Büttner and Wamser (2007).
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2 The model
Following HLN a multinational firm is domiciled in country p, but has af-
filiates in i = 1, ..., n countries. Each aﬃliate has fixed assets Ai and for
the purpose of exposition we shall let this asset be capital used to produce
a homogenous good by the production function yi = f(Ai). Rental costs of
capital are exogenous (small country assumption) and equal to r. Capital
Ai is financed either by equity Ii, external (third party) debt Li, or internal
debt Lˆi from related aﬃliates. The inclusion of internal debt is a new feature
we add to the HLN-model. The balance sheet of aﬃliate i can be stated as
Ai = Ii+Li+Lˆi, and the balance sheet of the MNC is
P
i6=p Ii = Ep+Lp+Lˆp.
Following HLN the cost function of external debt is
C(λi) =
μ
2
· (λi − λ∗)2 ·Ai + μ
2
· (λ∗)2 ·Ai, (1)
where λ∗ is the optimal leverage ratio in absence of taxation, λi = Li/Ai is
the leverage ratio of external debt in aﬃliate i, and μ > 0 is a cost parameter.
Internal debt costs may accrue due to the need to circumvent thin-
capitalization and controlled-foreign-company rules, say, and we assume in
line with the literature on internal debt that the cost function is given by
Cˆ(λˆi) =
η
2
· (λˆi)2 ·Ai if λˆi > 0 and Cˆ(λˆi) = 0 if λˆi ≤ 0 (2)
where λˆi = Lˆi/Ai is the leverage ratio of internal debt in aﬃliate i and η > 0
is a cost parameter. In line with HLN we define λf =
P
i Li/
P
iAi as the
firm wide leverage ratio for external debt, and follow them in that bankruptcy
costs are proportional to the MNC’s overall assets, as
Cf =
γ
2
· λ2f ·
X
i
Ai =
γ
2
· (
P
i Li)
2P
iAi
. (3)
In order to make clear how HLN implicitly invoke symmetry assumptions
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on withholding taxes, let true and taxable profit in aﬃliate i be πei and πti,
that is,
πei = f(Ai)− r ·Ai − C(λi)− Cˆ(λˆi), πti = f(Ai)− r · (Li + Lˆi).
Following HLN, debt costs are not tax deductible, but as seen above they
reduce true profit. As in HLN we let V Li and V
U
i be the values of a leveraged
and a completely unleveraged aﬃliate in country i, and define ti as the
statutory corporate tax rate in country i. Aﬃliate i’s profit after corporate
taxation in country i is then
πi = πei − ti · πti| {z }
=V Li
= (1− ti) · f(Ai)− r ·Ai| {z }
=V Ui
+ti·r·(Li+Lˆi)−C(λi)−Cˆ(λˆi), (4)
where it is seen that aﬃliate specific debt reduces potential dividend
payouts.
In a static one-period model as used by HLN, the value of a firm
¡
V L
¢
and the firm’s after tax profit (Πp) are identical, and can be calculated by
summing up profits across all aﬃliates. Following HLN, repatriated dividends
πi can be subject to a non-resident withholding tax (wei ), the parent tax rate
tp on repatriated dividends (adjusted possibly for various credit schemes)
and the corporate tax rate ti. In HLN the eﬀective tax rate on dividends is
defined as τ i and encompasses diﬀerent combinations of these three taxes,
depending on the system for taxing repatriated dividends.2 Equation (4)
shows, however, that the corporate tax rate ti cannot be compounded in τ i
(as done in HLN), but is a function of tp and wei only.
3
The value of the firm can be written asΠp = V L =
P
i τ i·V Li −Cf =
P
i τ i·
πi−Cf . Maximizing Πp taking into account that the overall sum of lending
and borrowing from related companies must be equal to zero (
P
i r · Lˆi = 0),
2See, e.g., page 87 where under the deduction system τ i = 1−(1− tp) (1− wei ) (1− ti) .
3See Leechor and Mintz (1993) for a discussion of how τ i also may depend on corporate
policy.
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the maximization problem is
max
Li,Lˆi
Πp =
X
i
τ i ·
n
(1− ti)f(Ai)− r ·Ai + ti · r · (Li + Lˆi)
− μ
2
·
µ
Li
Ai
− λ∗
¶2
·Ai − μ
2
· (λ∗)2 ·Ai − Cˆ(λˆi)
)
− γ
2
· (
P
i Li)
2P
iAi
s.t.
X
i
r · Lˆi = 0.
The resulting first order conditions are
Li : τ i ·
½
ti · r − μ ·
µ
Li
Ai
− λ∗
¶¾
− γ ·
P
i LiP
iAi
= 0, (5)
Lˆi : τ i ·
½
ti · r − Cˆ 0(λˆi) · 1
Ai
¾
−m · r = 0, (6)
where m is the Lagrangian multiplier. From (6) it follows that
Cˆ 0(λˆi)
Ai
= r · τ i · ti −mτ i and m = mini t
e
i = min
i
τ i · ti = τ 1 · t1. (7)
For illustrative purposes we number the countries such that country 1 has
the lowest eﬀective tax rate tei . By applying (2), λˆi = rη · τ i·ti−τ1·t1τ i > 0 in all
aﬃliates i > 1 and λˆ1 =
−
S
i>1 Lˆi
A1
< 0. This shows that it is profit maximizing
for a multinational firm to use internal debt and that any analysis that omits
internal debt does not model a tax-eﬃcient financing structure.
Next, it can be shown from the first order condition (5) that only if all
countries employ the same eﬀective tax on repatriated dividends (τ i = τ j,
i 6= j), can the first order condition (5) in HLN, which is used as a basis for
their regression equation (6) be derived.4 Applying the definitions given in
HLN for βk, k = 0, 1, 2, correcting these for the proper eﬀective withholding
tax term, we have β0 = τ ·μτ ·μ+γ , β1 =
1
τ ·μ+γ and β2 =
γ
τ ·μ+γ . Following the
4The full derivation is available in the technical appendix.
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same procedure as in HLN, we obtain
λi = β0 · λ∗ + β1 · r · τ · ti + β2 · r ·
X
j 6=i
(ti − tj) · ρj, (8)
which corresponds to equation (5) in HLN if we set the interest rate r = 1, an
assumption they implicitly invoke. Defining β3 = 1η and using τ i = τ j = τ
again, the total leverage ratio bi = λi + λˆi of an aﬃliate i > 1 is
bi = β0 · λ∗ + β1 · r · τ · ti + β2 · r ·
X
j 6=i
(ti − tj) · ρj + β3 · r · [ti − t1] , ∀ i > 1,
whilst the overall leverage ratio of the internal bank, b1 = λ1 + λˆ1, is
b1 = β0 · λ∗ + β1 · r · τ · t1 + β2 · r ·
X
j 6=1
(t1 − tj) · ρj −
P
i>1 Lˆi
A1
.
3 Interpretation of Empirical Results
In the empirical application, HLN measure leverage as total leverage includ-
ing internal debt. The equation they estimate is
bpit = αp + β1 · τ pit + β2 ·
X
j 6=i
(τ pit − τ pjt)ρpjt + γ ·Xpit + ²pit,
where X represents various control variables and ² is an error term. The
index pit is subsidiary i of parent firm p at time t. Parent firms are not
included in their main sample, and data on subsidiaries outside Europe is
unavailable. According to our revised version of their model they should
have estimated
bpit = αp+β1r ·τ tit+β2r ·
X
j 6=i
(tit−tjt)ρpjt+β3r ·(tit − tp1t)+γ ·Xpit+²pit, ∀ pi > p1
6
In this equation tp1t denotes the corporate tax rate of the subsidiary within
the group facing the lowest corporate tax rate. We see immediately that
the inclusion of r demands some reinterpretation of their estimated coeﬃ-
cients.5 Furthermore, the use of τ pit (as they define it) instead of tit will cause
an attenuation bias in β2 due to measurement error in their main variable,P
j 6=i(τ pit− τ pjt)ρpjt.6 Regarding the sample, we see that it is the subsidiary
in the low tax country that should have been excluded, rather than the parent
firm.
We will put these issues aside and focus on the eﬀect of the omitted
variable (tit − tp1t) . Both Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004), Mintz and We-
ichenrieder (2005), Büttner et al (2006) and Büttner and Wamser (2007)
find that internal debt is sensitive to tax rates. It is therefore likely that this
is an important explanatory variable for total leverage. Since (tit − tp1t) ≈
(τ pit−τ p1t), and (τ it−τ p1t) is part of their main variable
P
j 6=i(τ pit−τ pjt)ρpjt,
the omitted variable (tit − tp1t) will be positively correlated with their main
variable.7 This will cause a positive bias in the estimated β2. Actually, it is
quite possible that the eﬀect HLN find of the diﬀerences between the national
and foreign tax rates on leverage, is driven by internal debt rather than the
external debt mechanism they model.8
It should be noted that HLN discuss internal debt in an extension to the
empirical analysis. In order to explore the robustness of their results, they
5Assuming that r = 1 as HLN implicitly do seems rather haphazardous.
6What happens to β1 is harder to assess. τpit is diﬀerent from the “true” variable
τti coming out of the revised model, but this “true” variable builds on the inaccurate
symmetry assumption τ i = τ j for all i and j.
7Note that (tit − tp1t) = (τpit − τp1t) in cases where both the parent firm and the
subsidiary belong to countries in the Euro-zone.
8The external debt mechanism they model depends on the assumption that parent
firms provide explicit or implicit credit guarantees for the debt of all their subsidiaries.
One motive of setting up a subsidiary in a foreign country may, however, be to limit the
liability of the parent company. If this is common, the true β2 will be small. On the other
hand, (tit − tp1t), is unobservable in cases where MNCs have subsidiaries in tax havens
outside Europe. This may weaken the omitted variable bias, although it also increases the
measurement error in their main variable.
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construct a variable ϕi, capturing the relative tax advantage of internal debt
versus equity. This variable is defined in their table 6. It will in most cases
be equal to (ti − tp).9 They report the result of adding ϕi to the regression
in table 11, column (1). They do not find a significant eﬀect of this variable
and conclude that their main result is not aﬀected by the incentive to use
internal debt. It is, however, evident from our revised version of their model
that this ad hoc procedure is ill-conceived since it is not the tax diﬀerence
vis-a-vis the parent firm that matters, but the tax diﬀerence vis-a-vis the
subsidiary facing the lowest tax rate within the group.
4 Technical Appendix not intended for pub-
lication
This appendix explains in detail the structure of the model used in the above
comment, and provides a detailed derivation of the optimal leverage ratios
therein.
Assume that a multinational firm (MNC) owns aﬃliates in i = 1, ..., n
countries and is itself located in country p. Each aﬃliate produces a homoge-
nous good according to the production function yi = f(Ai), using capital Ai
as the only input. Rental costs of capital are exogenous (small country as-
sumption) and equal to r. Capital Ai is financed either by equity Ii, external
(third party) debt Li or internal debt Lˆi, the latter stemming from related
aﬃliates. Thus, the balance sheet of aﬃliate i reads
Ai = Ii + Li + Lˆi. (9)
Following Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodème (2008) (henceforth HLN), we will
assume that the level of capital Ai is fixed in any aﬃliate and that the
9This is, e.g., the case when both the subsidiary and the parent belong to an EU country.
Repatriated dividends are tax exempt in the parent country while interests received are
subject to the ordinary corporate income tax.
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MNC will adjust its equity if there is a change in the level of debt, 4Ii =
−4(Li + Lˆi). Without loss of generality, we assume that all aﬃliates are
directly owned by the parent MNC and that its outside assets are zero,
Ap = 0. The balance sheet of the MNC, accordingly, readsX
i6=p
Ii = Ep + Lp + Lˆp. (10)
Debt causes additional costs both in an aﬃliate and — as bankruptcy costs
in case of bail outs of aﬃliates — in the whole MNC. As internal debt is in fact
more like tax-deductible equity than debt,10 we are going to assume that the
cost functions of external and internal debt are separable. All cost functions
are assumed to be convex in the leverage ratios, but proportional in capital
employed.
In external debt, there are some profits from, e.g., mitigating informa-
tional asymmetries and therefore from dampening moral hazard eﬀects of
managers, but there are also costs involved, e.g., due to inducing too risk-
averse behavior or bankruptcy costs on the aﬃliate level. Hence, we assume
that there is an optimal leverage ratio λ∗ in absence of taxation (trading
pro and cons of external debt) in each aﬃliate. According to HLN, the cost
function of external debt is assumed to be
C(λi) =
μ
2
· (λi − λ∗)2 ·Ai − μ
2
· (λ∗)2 ·Ai, (11)
where λi = LiAi represents the leverage ratio in external debt in aﬃliate i.
Internal debt costs accrue due to circumventing thin-capitalization and
controlled-foreign-company rules or to hire lawyers etc to hide the true nature
the balance. If there is no internal debt or if the aﬃliate is an internal lender,
10In line with this Chowdhry and Coval (1998) pp. 87f, and Stonehill and Stitzel (1969)
argue that internal debt should in fact be seen as tax-favored equity.
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no costs accrue. The cost function is given by
Cˆ(λˆi) =
η
2
· (λˆi)2 ·Ai, if λˆi > 0, (12)
Cˆ(λˆi) = 0, if λˆi ≤ 0,
where λˆi = LˆiAi represents the leverage ratio in internal debt in aﬃliate i. Note
that there is no reason why η should be equal to μ in equation (11), as internal
and external debt are diﬀerent in nature and therefore their associated costs
should diﬀer as well.
Analogously to HLN, the MNC is willing to bail out any aﬃliate, which
is going bankrupt. Thus, bankruptcy costs depend on the firm-wide leverage
ratio in external debt, λf , across all aﬃliates. This overall leverage ratio is
defined as λf =
S
i LiS
iAi
., and total bankruptcy costs are given by
Cf =
γ
2
· λ2f ·
X
i
Ai =
γ
2
· (
P
i Li)
2P
iAi
. (13)
In order to make clear how HLN implicitly invoke symmetry assumptions
on withholding taxes it is useful to lay out a proper microfoundation for
taxation. Let economic profits in aﬃliate i before any taxation be
πei = f(Ai)− r ·Ai − C(λi)− Cˆ(λˆi). (14)
According to most real-world tax systems and in line with HLN, we assume
that rental costs of equity are not tax deductible. Moreover, neither costs of
external debt nor cost of internal debt are assumed to be deductible from the
corporate tax base. This does not have any qualitative eﬀect on the results
and corresponds to the modeling in HLN. Hence, taxable profits are given as
πti = f(Ai)− r · (Li + Lˆi). (15)
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Put together, an aﬃliate’s profit after corporate taxation in country i is
πi = πei − ti · πti| {z }
=V Li
= (1− ti) · f(Ai)− r ·Ai| {z }
=V Ui
+ti · r · (Li + Lˆi)− C(λi)− Cˆ(λˆi),
(16)
where ti is the (statutory) corporate tax rate in country i, and V Li and V
U
i
are the values of a leveraged and a completely unleveraged aﬃliate in country
i. An important point and a major distinction to the set-up in HLN is to
note from the above equation that the aﬃliate specific costs of external and
internal debt, C(λi) and Cˆ(λˆi), do reduce the amount of dividends (πi) that
can be paid out.
In a static one-period model as the one used by HLN, the value of a
firm
¡
V L
¢
and the firm’s after tax profit (Πp) are identical. Thus, total
profits of the MNC, Πp = V L, can be calculated by summing up profits
across all aﬃliates, taking into account potential double taxation by impure
tax credits, withholding taxes, etc., and deducting MNC-wide bankruptcy
costs Cf . Following HLN, repatriated dividends πi can be subject to a non-
resident withholding tax (wei ), the parent tax rate tp on repatriated dividends
(adjusted possibly for various credit schemes) and the corporate tax rate ti.
In HLN τ i is the eﬀective tax rate on dividends and encompasses diﬀerent
combinations of wei , tp and ti depending on the system for taxing repatriated
dividends.11 Our set up, however, has made it clear that the corporate tax
rate ti cannot be part of the eﬀective tax rate on repatriated income. We
will nevertheless use τ i to denote the eﬀective after tax rate on dividends,
11See e.g., page 87 where under the deduction system τ i = 1−(1− tp) (1− wei ) (1− ti) .
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but τ i is a function of tp and wei only. Then,
Πp = V L =
X
i
τ i · πi − Cf
=
X
i
τ i · {(1− ti)f(Ai)− r ·Ai}| {z }
=V U
(17)
+
X
i
τ i ·
n
ti · r · (Li + Lˆi)− C(λi)− Cˆ(λˆi)
o
− Cf(λf).
Note that the overall sum of lending and borrowing in internal debt and
therefore the total internal interest payments across all aﬃliates must be
equal to zero. The reason is that at least one aﬃliate must be a lender
which will receive all the interest paid on internal debt by other aﬃliates.
Consequently, X
i
r · Lˆi = 0. (18)
Relying on equations (11), (13) and (17) as well as taking into account the
restriction on internal debt in (18), the optimization problem can be stated
as
max
Li,Lˆi
Πp =
X
i
τ i
n
(1− ti)f(Ai)− r ·Ai + ti · r · (Li + Lˆi) (19)
− μ
2
·
µ
Li
Ai
− λ∗
¶2
·Ai − μ
2
· (λ∗)2 ·Ai − Cˆ(λˆi)
)
− γ
2
· (
P
i Li)
2P
iAi
s.t.
X
i
r · Lˆi = 0,
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where λˆi = LˆiAi . The resulting first order conditions are
τ i
½
ti · r − μ ·
µ
Li
Ai
− λ∗
¶¾
− γ ·
P
i LiP
iAi
= 0, (20)
τ i ·
½
ti · r − Cˆ 0(λˆi) · 1
Ai
¾
−m · r = 0, (21)
where m represents the Lagrangian multiplier.
From (20) we derive
Cˆ 0(λˆi)
Ai
= r · τ i · ti −mτ i > 0 (22)
and, consequently,
m = min
i
tei = τ i · ti = τ 1 · t1, (23)
assuming that aﬃliate 1 has the lowest eﬀective tax rate tei . Equation (23)
follows from (22) and the fact that Cˆ 0(λˆi) ≥ 0, ∀ λi. In sum thuis implies
that Lˆi > 0 in all aﬃliates i > 1. From (18) it follows that λˆ1 = −
S
i>1 Lˆi
A1
< 0.
Moreover, we have
Cˆ 0
Ai
= η · Lˆi
Ai
= η · λˆi, ∀ i > 1, (24)
from applying equation (12). Accordingly, from (22) and (23) the optimal
internal leverage ratio in aﬃliate i > 1 reads
λˆi =
r
η ·
τ i · ti − τ 1 · t1
τ i
,∀ i > 1. (25)
Turning to equation (5) , rearranging it yields
τ i · μ · λi = τ i · μ · λ∗ + τ i · ti · r − γλi · ρi − γ ·
X
j 6=i
λj · ρj, (26)
where ρi = AiS
iAi
. Subtracting equation (5), evaluated for aﬃliate j, from
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equation (5), evaluated for aﬃliate i, we obtain
λj =
τ i
τ j
· λi − τ i · ti − τ j · tjτ j · μ · r +
τ i − τ j
τ j
· λ∗. (27)
Applying (27) in (26), we have
τ i · μ · λi = τ i · μ · λ∗ + τ i · ti · r − γ · λi · ρi (28)
+ γ ·
X
j 6=i
τ i · ti − τ j · tj
τ j · μ · r · ρj
− γ ·
X
j 6=i
τ i
τ j
· λi · ρj − γ ·
X
j 6=i
τ i − τ j
τ j
· λ∗ · ρj.
It is now fairly obvious that there is no easy way to simplify this expression
in order to solve it for an explicit optimal leverage ratio λi of external debt.
It is straightforward to show that only if τ i = τ j, i 6= j, can we reproduce
the rearranged first order condition (5) in HLN, which is used as a basis
for the regression equation (6) in HLN. This is not an innocent assumption
since it eﬀectively amounts to assuming that all countries employ the same
eﬀective tax on repatriated dividends, i.e the sum of the withholding tax
and the home country tax on repatriated dividends must be the same across
countries. Invoking this symmetry τ i = τ j = τ , equation (27) reduces to
λj = λi −
ti − tj
μ · r (29)
and equation (28) simplifies to
τ · μ · λi = τ · μ · λ∗ + τ · ti · r − γ · λi · ρi (30)
− γ · λi ·
X
j 6=i
ρj + γ ·
X
j 6=i
ti − tj
μ · r · ρj.
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Recall thatX
j 6=i
ρj =
X
j 6=i
AjP
iAi
=
P
iAi −AiP
iAi
= 1− AiP
iAi
= 1− ρi. (31)
By substituting equation (31) into (30), collecting all terms with a λi on the
LHS and slightly rearranging, we end up with
λi =
τ · μ
τ · μ+ γ · λ
∗ +
r
τ · μ+ γ · τ · ti (32)
+
γ · r
τ · μ+ γ ·
X
j 6=i
(ti − tj) · ρj.
Applying the definitions given on page 95 in HLN for βk, k = 0, 1, 2,
and correcting these for the proper eﬀective withholding tax term, we have
β0 = τ ·μτ ·μ+γ , β1 =
1
τ ·μ+γ and β2 =
γ
τ ·μ+γ . Then, equation (32) becomes
λi = β0 · λ∗ + β1 · r · τ · ti + β2 · r ·
X
j 6=i
(ti − tj) · ρj, (33)
which corresponds to equation (5) in HLN, if we set the interest rate r = 1,
an assumption they implicitly invoke.
Adding the optimal leverage ratio of internal debt (25), defining β3 = 1η
and using τ i = τ j = τ again, the total leverage ratio bi of an aﬃliate i > 1 is
bi = λi + λˆi (34)
= β0 · λ∗ + β1 · r · τ · ti + β2 · r ·
X
j 6=i
(ti − tj) · ρj
+ β3 · r · [ti − t1] , ∀ i > 1.
The total leverage ratio in aﬃliate 1, acting as internal bank, is instead
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given by
b1 = λ1 + λˆ1 (35)
= β0 · λ∗ + β1 · r · τ · t1 + β2 · r ·
X
j 6=1
(t1 − tj) · ρj −
P
i>1 Lˆi
A1
,
where λˆ1 = −
S
i>1 Lˆi
A1
in order to fulfill the constraint on internal interest
payments (18).
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